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　This study compares the investment behavior of institutional investors in Japan and France. Using the data of fi rms 
listed on the First Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange and the data of fi rms making up SBF120 in France during 2005-2010, 
this paper examines the relationship between institutional investors and firm performance in Japan and France. The 
results suggest there was a statistically signifi cant diff erence between the change in institutional investors’ shareholdings 
and ROE, proxy for fi rm performance, in Japan, whereas a signifi cant diff erence was not observed in France. However, by 
classifying the fi rms into three groups based on the change in the ownership share of institutional investors during 2005-
2010 in France, it was observed that the mean value of ROE in group 3 is higher than in other groups, indicating that the 
group with the highest increase of institutional investor’s ownership during the period showed better performance than 
other groups. The results imply that institutional investors select fi rms for investment based on the expected performance 
of ROE in both countries.
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１．Introduction
　Institutional investors have become active in strengthening corporate governance with an eye of enhancing corporate 
value in Japan and France since the beginning of 2000s. They exercise the voting rights at the general shareholders’ 
meeting and some of them engage in dialogue with investee companies in order to enhance the value of investee 
fi rms. However, the investment behavior of institutional investors and monitoring activity is not well-known. The paper 
considers the relationship between investment behavior and fi rm’s value creation of institutional investors. Corporate 
governance reform has been promoted with the intention of improving the corporate value through shareholder-
oriented management style. Governance guidelines and monitoring by institutional investors is expected to aff ect the 
improvement of corporate performance. After examination of the impact of governance guidelines and monitoring, the 
relationship between corporate governance and fi nancial performance is empirically looked into in both countries in 
this study. Relationship between corporate governance and fi rm performance is not clear in spite of abundant empirical 
research that has been made so far in a number of countries. Generally speaking, institutional investors have a tendency 
to invest in companies keen on improving governance structure. As such, the strength of governance might have an 
impact on funding activities of fi rms. The debate on corporate governance has become active since the mid-1990s in 
Japan and France. The increasing international ownership had a signifi cant impact on corporate governance in both 
countries. CALPERS, a longtime leader of the US corporate governance movement, had its fi rst major round of meetings 
with European and Japanese corporate managements in 1994. 
　The contributions of this paper is twofold The fi rst is that the paper employs a dynamic analysis of the changes of 
share ownership of institutional investors during FY2005-FY2010 for the examination of fi rm performance, instead of 
conventional static analysis which employs share ownership of institutional investors at a specifi c date. The second is 
to appreciate the investment behavior, inter alia, criteria on investment in and value creation of fi rms by institutional 
investors in Japan and France. The study consists of eight parts. In the next section, the paper summarizes the evolution 
of corporate governance in Japan and France followed by literature review. Section 4 describes comparison of corporate 
governance between Japan and France and some areas for improvement and research design is explained in section 5. 
Section 6 presents results and analysis, and implications for Japan drawn from the practice of corporate governance in 
France are discussed in section 7. The last part concludes the study with general remarks.






　Institutional investors are organizations that pool large sums of money which they invest in various companies. 
Insurance companies, mutual funds, investment advisors, pension funds, hedge funds, private equity, and university 
endowments are the most common types of institutional investors. They have some infl uence in the management of 
fi rms because they are entitled to exercise the voting rights. As such, they can actively engage in corporate governance. 
There are different types of institutional investors. Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors in three groups. 
Dedicated institutional investors characterized by concentrated and long term institutional holdings, transient 
institutional investors with short term and diversifi ed holdings while Quasi-indexers have diversifi ed and long term 
holdings. He fi nds that dedicated institutional investors are involved in monitoring. Their role in the economy is to act 
as highly specialized investors on behalf of others. Çelik, S. and M. Isaksson (2013) classifi es institutional investors 
in three categories. The fi rst category of institutional investors is referred to as “traditional” investors and comprises 
pension funds, investments funds and insurance companies. Second category is referred to as “alternative” institutional 
investors and comprises hedge funds, private equity funds, exchange-traded funds and sovereign wealth funds. Third 
category is referred to as “asset managers” that invest in their clients’ name.
　Numerous institutional investors act as intermediaries between lenders and borrowers. Thus, they have a critical 
importance in the functioning of the financial markets. Acting as savings pools, they also play a critical role in 
guaranteeing a suffi  cient diversifi cation of the investors' portfolios. Their greater ability to monitor corporate behavior 
as well to select investors’ profi les implies that they help diminish agency costs. Furthermore, they infl uence corporate 
payout and investment policies. Higher payouts are encouraged by institutional investors, especially in fi rms with high 
free cash fl ow and poor investment opportunities. They also positively infl uence stock repurchases, particularly in fi rms 
with high information asymmetry. The substitution of stock repurchases for dividends as a percentage of total payout is 
frequently encouraged by them.
３．Literature Review
　Institutional investors as corporate monitors are a focus of many studies and research. It is widely argued that 
institutional investors are an important corporate governance mechanism that improves firm performance, as they 
possess both the ability and the incentive to monitor and discipline corporate managers (Ping & Wing, 2011). Rose 
(2007) justifies the effectiveness of institutional investors as a corporate governance tool based on the grounds 
that institutional investors might discipline management, because the free-rider problem associated with dispersed 
ownership is alleviated. However, literature on institutional investor’s influence on corporate governance in Japan 
is rather limited. Mizuno and Tabner (2009) discuss the evolution of institutional investor’s influence on corporate 
governance in Japan. Pioneer work on institutional investor in Japan was carried out by Omura, et all. (2001) and 
Yonezawa & Hashimoito (2002). The former clarifi ed the institutional investor’s behavior and a change in attitude based 
on the survey and revealed that the behavior varies depending on the type of institutional investors. The latter pointed 
out that the guideline on the voting is required in order to exercise voting rights in earnest. Seki (2005) and Miwa (2006) 
argue that institutional investors have become active in accordance with legal changes in order to strengthen the 
monitoring functions in Japanese companies and they have grown to substantial size and own signifi cant percentages 
of individual companies. Ueda (2007) describes that institutional investors seek greater disclosure and accountability 
in terms of performance and corporate governance. The shareholder activism of institutional investors was initiated 
by foreign investors followed by Japanese institutional investors. The institutional investors and corporate governance 
in various countries is described in the book entitled “The institutional investors and corporate governance” (edited 
by Baum, et al., 1993). The Centre for European Policy Studies (1995) points out that international diversification 
and increasing cross-border activity of institutional investors can be instrumental in changing corporate governance 
standards as a result of the active stance towards investment that is required by local laws and codes. Mallin (2007) 
argues that there has been a general increase in the level of engagement of institutional investors with their investee 
companies. Monco and Finet (2011) describes the influence of long term institutional investors on corporate 
governance and strategy by citing the case of Wendel in France. 
　In UK, the Cadbury (1992) Committee considered institutional investors as having a special responsibility to ensure 
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that its recommendations are adopted by companies, stating that ‘we look to the institutions, in particular, to use 
their infl uence as owners to ensure that the companies in which they have invested comply with the Code’. Similarly, 
Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) Committees emphasized an important role played by institutional investors 
in ensuring corporate governance. The Combined Code (2003) principles of good governance state the following 
concerning the role of institutional shareholders:
(1) Institutional shareholders should enter into a dialogue with companies based on the mutual understanding of 
objectives;
(2) When evaluating companies’ governance arrangements, particularly those relating to board structure and 
composition, institutional investors should give due weight to all relevant factors drawn to their attention; and
(3) Institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make considered use of their votes.
　Moreover, Financial Reporting Council of UK (2012) sets out the principle of institutional investors which require 
them to publicly disclose their policy on how they discharge their stewardship responsibilities. Stewardship activities 
include monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, and 
corporate governance, including culture and remuneration. 
　Three-quarters of institutional investors say that board practices are at least as important as fi nancial performance 
when they evaluate companies for investment (Coombes and Watson, 2000). Over 80 percent of them say that they 
would pay more for the shares of a well-governed company than for those of a poorly governed one with a comparable 
financial performance. It is, therefore, surmised that there exists a positive relationship between good corporate 
governance and institutional investor’s attitudes. But a question arises as to whether companies with a high ratio 
of institutional ownership outperform those with lower institutional ownership. So far, various studies suggest that 
there has been no strong evidence of correlation between share ownership of institutional investors and financial 
performance of fi rms. However, a company with good corporate governance is more likely to attract investment from 
institutional investors compared to poorly governed companies (Mckinsey & Co, 2002). Another question is whether 
institutional investor activism targeted at specific companies brings about better performance. Shareholders are 
growing increasingly active in the United States and elsewhere because they believe that better corporate governance 
will bring them higher rewards. Daily, et al. (1996) found no significant relationship between firm performance 
measured by abnormal stock price returns, return on assets, or return on equity and ownership by institutions as a 
whole, or ownership by activist institutions. However, Nesbitt (1994) reports positive long-term stock price returns 
to fi rms targeted by CalPERS. Opler and Sokobin (1997) fi nd signifi cant above-market performance in the year after 
targeting. Sahut and Gharbi (2011) shows that there exists positive impact of institutional activism by analyzing 
firms making up SBF120 during 2006-2008. In spite of the fact that the amount of activism has increased during 
the past decade, a majority of the studies, however, could not fi nd a link between monitoring and an increase in fi rm 
performance. 
　Gompers, et al. (2003) found that in 1991-99, investors going long on well-governed fi rms, as defi ned by an index 
combining 24 diff erent aspects of corporate governance, while shorting poorly-governed ones, would have enjoyed an 
unusually high annual return of 8.5%. Similarly strong returns were found for a trading strategy based on a narrower 
list of what reformers consider the six core elements of good corporate governance, such as making the company’s 
whole board face re-election each year, and not having any “poison pill” defenses against takeovers. However, a recent 
study by Bebchuk, et al. (2010) doubts the results of the research by Gompers, et al. by repeating the study for 2000-
08. It finds that, in contrast with the 1990s, neither the 24-factor index nor the six-factor one would have helped 
investors beat the market. They argue that the disappearance of the good-governance premium during the past decade 
is actually a sign that investors have woken up to the importance of governance. They think that this was due to a 
huge increase in discussion of the issue in the media in 2001-02, following the Enron and WorldCom scandals and the 
publication of the Gompers study. As a result, they argue, early in the decade diff erences in the quality of governance 
between diff erent fi rms were fully incorporated in their share prices. Since this adjustment was a one-off , well-governed 





Selection of fi rms and grouping
　In this paper, the data of the firms are those which were continuously listed on the first section of Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) from FY2005-FY2010 (April 2005 to March 2011) and are constructed using NEEDS-Cges and 
fi nancial reports of fi rms. The total number of fi rms inspected was 1,334 companies excluding banks and fi nancial 
institutions. Traditionally, the relationship between institutional investors and fi rm performance has been studied in 
relation to the structure of ownership share at a certain date. The feature of this study lies in the dynamic analysis by 
examining the eff ect of the change of ownership share of institutional investors on fi rm performance during FY2005 
and FY2010, rather than the traditional static analysis using the ownership share at a certain date. Types of typical 
institutional investors include pension funds, trust banks, insurance companies, investment advisors and investment 
trusts. The relationship between the change in the ownership share of institutional investors and fi rm performance 
covers six-year period from FY2005 through FY2010. First, the relationship between the change in the ownership 
share of institutional investors and fi rm performance is looked into. Second, the fi rms are divided into fi ve groups as 
below from the viewpoint of an increase in the ownership share of institutional investors: 
a. group 1: fi rst quintile-the least increase in the ownership share of institutional investors (266 fi rms)
b. group 2: second quintile-the second least increase in the ownership share of institutional investors (267 fi rms)
c. group 3: third quintile- the middle increase in the ownership share of institutional investors (267 fi rms)
d. group 4: fourth quintile-the second highest increase in the ownership share of institutional investors (267 fi rms)
e. group 5: fi fth quintile-the highest increase in the ownership share of institutional investors (267 fi rms)
There are a number of fi nancial indicators to gauge fi rm performance including a share price return, ROA, ROE, and 
Tobin’s q. In this study, ROE is used as proxy of fi rm performance.
4.2 France
　For France, companies that made up the SBF120 in 2005 and 2010 are used. The data are collected from those 
companies which continuously made up the SBF120 in 2005 and 2010. Large companies composing CAC40 are 
also separately inspected. The SBF 120 (Société des Bourses Françaises 120 Index) is a French stock market index. 
It is based on the 120 most actively traded stocks listed on Euronext Paris. It includes all 40 stocks in the CAC40 
index plus a selection of 80 additional stocks listed on the Premier Marché and Second Marché under Euronext Paris. 
The typical example of companies belonging to CAC40 includes Air Liquide, Alcatel-Lucent, AXA, Carrefour, EADS, 
Groupe Danone, L'Oréal, LVMH, Michelin, PSA Peugeot Citroën, Saint-Gobain, SANOFI-AVENTIS, Société Générale, Suez 
Environnement, Total, Vinci, and Vivendi. Companies listed on the Euronext Paris are divided into compartment A, 
compartment B, compartment C, in accordance with the market capitalization; € 1 billion or more for compartment A, 
€ 150 million ~ € 1 billion for compartment B, and less than € 150 million for compartment C. In addition, there exists 
foreign compartment. In terms of market segments of inspected companies, all belong to compartment A for CAC40 
companies except for 2. On the other hand, 47 companies belong to compartment A, 23 companies to compartment 
B, 9 companies to compartment C, and 1 company to foreign compartment for non-CAC40 companies. The number 
of samples used for this analysis is 111 due to the limitation of data on share ownership of institutional investors. As 
proxy for performance, ROA, ROE, and TobinQ are used. The companies are divided into three groups as follows from 
the viewpoint of changes in the ownership share of institutional investors:
a. group 1: first one-third of companies-the least increase in the share ownership of institutional investors (37 
companies)
b. group 2: second one-third of companies-the middle increase in the share ownership of institutional investors (37 
companies)
c. group 3: third one-third of companies-the highest increase in the share ownership of institutional investors (37 
companies)
Data used for the analysis are the annual report of each company and Thomson One.
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５．Results and Analysis
5.1 Japan
　It was found that during the period of FY2005-FY2010 institutional investor’s ownership decreased from 25.9% to 
22.5% and the change of institutional investor’s ownership share in each group during the same period is shown below:
Group 1: -51.5%~-9.09%  mean: -15.72%, Group 2: -9.09%~-4.06%  mean: -6.29%
Group 3: -4.06%~0.90%  mean: -2.42%,  Group 4: -0.88%~2.13%   mean: 0.52%
Group 5: 2.16%~31.14%  mean: 6.87%
To look into the above relationship the following variables are used for the statistical analysis and the acronym of 
variables used in the analysis appears below.
Acronym of variables:
INST: ownership share of institutional investors
INST_FRGN：ownership share of foreign institutional investors
INST_DOME：ownership share of domestic institutional investors 
FRGN: ownership share of foreigners
FRGN_CORP: ownership share of foreign corporation
CORSS: ratio of cross shareholding
ANTE: ratio of stable shareholding
BRD: number of board members
ID: number of outside directors
EROE3:excess returns over the three year average ROE controlled by industry and fi rm size
XXX_CHANGE：subtraction of 2005 from 2010 fi gures
　As shown in Table 1, domestic institutional investors, on average, have reduced the shareholding ratio compared 
to foreign institutional investors during the analysis period. However, standard deviation in domestic and foreign 
institutional investors is at 6.1% and 6.7%, indicating that the stock replacement was carried out relatively frequently 
with virtually the same degree. On the other hand, foreign corporations did not change the shareholding ratio so much, 
as evidenced by the small number of a standard deviation of 1.4%. The standard deviation of stable shareholders, which 
were assumed to be inactive traders, was higher in the analysis period than institutional investors, suggesting that there 
was more buying and selling compared to them. In addition, surprisingly, relatively high standard deviation of 4.8% was 
observed in the cross-shareholding shareholders. As a measure of fi rm performance, the mean of ROE during 2005-
2010 (ROE05_10) and the excess returns of the mean of ROE for the three years up to the year 2010 subtracted by the 
excess returns of the mean of ROE for the three years up to the year 2005 after adjusting the size and industry (EROE3_
CHANGE) are used.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
　Table 2 represents correlation matrix of various variables. As expected, the change in ownership share by foreign 
institutional investors and that of by foreigners has a very high correlation coeffi  cient of 0.98. The change in ownership 
share of foreign institutional investors and that of foreign corporation has a moderately negative correlation coeffi  cient 
of -0.12. In this regard, it is meaningful to analyze by separating the share ownership of foreign institutional investors 
and foreign corporation. Looking into the correlation with the performance, moderate correlation coeffi  cient of 0.22 
is observed between EROE3_CHANGE and INST_CHNAGE and both foreign and domestic institutional investors’ 
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correlation with EROE3_CHANGE is also moderate. However, there is virtually no correlation between FRGN_CORP_
CHANGE and EROE3_CHANGE. Further, the change of ratio of stable shareholding (ANTEI) has a negative correlation 
with EROE3_CHANGE. On the other hand, although the correlation with ROE05_10 and INST_CHNAGE is moderate, the 
correlation between ROE05_10 and INST_DOME_CHANGE is quite small.
Table 2: Correlation matrix
　EROE3 has been controlled by industry and firm size. Significant correlation between the change in domestic 
and foreign institutional investors and the change in EROE3 is noted (Table 3). The change in the number of stable 
shareholders, board of directors, and the number of outside directors did not have an impact on the change in EROE3.
Table 3: Summary of regression results-EROE3_CHANGE as dependent variable
　Table 4 shows the result of multiple regression analysis. The mean ROE during 2005- 2010 is defined as the 
dependent variable. Similar to EROE3, the change in domestic and foreign institutional investors’ shareholding has a 
signifi cant positive correlation. 
Table 4: Summary of regression results-ROE05 10 as dependent variable
　Next, one-way ANOVA and multiple comparison analysis is conducted to examine the diff erence between the groups 
by classifying the fi rms into fi ve groups in accordance with the change in ownership share of institutional investors as 
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mentioned in section 4.1. The descriptive statistics of the relationship between the change in the ratio of ownership 
share of institutional investors and fi rm performance appear in Table 5. The mean value of ROE employed to measure 
the financial performance is higher in group 5, indicating that the group with the highest increase of institutional 
ownership share shows better performance than other groups. This indicates that institutional investors select fi rms 
for investment based on the performance of ROE, which has correlation with share price. In order to examine whether 
there is a significant difference between the groups one-way ANOVA was carried out (Table 6). Since the equality 
of variances is not confirmed by F-test, differences in mean values in ROE were assessed with Tamhane multiple 
comparison procedure. The results of the assessment show that a statistically signifi cant diff erence was observed at 
1% level between the group 1, 3, 4, and the group 5, and at 5% level between the group 2 and the group 5. It was also 
found that a statistically signifi cant diff erence was observed at 5% level between the group 1 and 3 (Table 7). Thus, it is 
confi rmed that the institutional investors selected the investee fi rms by attaching high priority to ROE.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Table 6: One-way ANOVA
Note: *** denotes statistically signifi cant at the 1％ level.
Table 7 : Multiple comparison of ROE
Note: ** denotes statistically signifi cant at the 5％ level and *** denotes at the 1％ level.
Number of fi rms Mean Standarddeviation Maximum Minimum
ROE
1 266 1.66 12.44 33.15 -104.91
2 267 3.80 13.80 31.38 -190.19
3 267 3.94 9.43 36.81 -78.71
4 267 4.23 6.92 31.86 -24.89
5 267 6.68 6.33 32.01 -2.87
total 1334 4.06
Sum of square Degree offreedom Mean square F-ratio P-value
ROE
between groups 3398.013 4 849.503 8.135 .000***
within groups 138788.744 1329 104.431
total 142186.757 1333






























　A multiple regression analysis was conducted to see whether institutional investors had contributed to the 
improvement of fi rm performance. As explanatory variables, the changes in board structure and independent directors 
(auditors), introduction of employee director, and shareholder composition as well as the change in the ratio of 
share ownership of institutional investors were considered. Firm size and industry dummy are also added as control 
variables. It turned out that result of the analysis with ROE as dependent variable is not a good model as R2 is low and 
the signifi cance probability of the F value is high. However, the analysis with ROA as dependent variable revealed that 
model 2 which includes control variables is superior to model 1. It was found that in model 2 it is not signifi cant in 
relation to the changes in share ownership of institutional investors, but, it is signifi cant at the 5% level in relation to 
shareholder composition and fi rm size, and also signifi cant at the 10% level in relation to the changes in independent 
directors (auditors). The coeffi  cient of the change in board structure and independent directors (auditors), introduction 
of employee director are negative, albeit they are not signifi cant, suggesting that separation of the chairman and CEO, 
the change in independent directors (auditors), and introduction of employee director had a negative impact on fi rm 
performance (Table 8).
Table 8：Summary of regression results-ROA as dependent variable
　Next, one-way ANOVA and multiple comparison analysis are conducted to examine the diff erence between the groups 
by classifying the fi rms into three groups in accordance with the changes in ownership share of institutional investors 
during 2005-2010. The descriptive statistics of the relationship between the changes in the ratio of ownership share 
of institutional investors and fi rm performance appear in Table 9. Number of samples is 111 SBF120 companies whose 
fi nancial data and the ratio of share ownership of institutional investors were available, and the eff ect of the changes 
in the ratio of share ownership of institutional investors on fi rm performance was carried out. The results of one-way 
ANOVA and multiple comparison analysis can be summarized as follows (Table 10 & 11):
(ⅰ) The mean value of ROA and ROE is the highest in group 3, indicating that the group with the highest increase 
in institutional investor’s ownership share shows better performance than other groups. Statistically signifi cant 
diff erence of ROE was observed at the 10% level between the group 1 and 3.
(ⅱ) Institutional investors had invested in a good company with high capital efficiency, i.e. high ROE. There exits 
positive correlation between ROE and share price and, therefore ROE is regarded as an important financial 
indicator for investment. It is confi rmed that institutional investors attach importance to this indicator from the 
viewpoint of investment effi  ciency.
(ⅲ) The mean value of TobinQ in group 1, the least increase in share ownership by institutional investors, is the highest 
among the three groups. This is attributed to the fact that there was a company whose value of TobinQ was more 
than 10 during 2005-2006, but subsequently rapidly decreased to about 1 (Euro Disney). In addition, the value of 
TobinQ of three companies ranged from 3 to 4 during the analysis period (Hermes Intl, Dassault Systemes, Nicox). 
It might be surmised that judging from the high value of TobinQ the market anticipates greater profi tability in the 
future for the three companies.
1 2
coeffi  cient p-value coeffi  cient p-value
C 3.716 .000 -1.765 .488
Changes in the share ownership of 
institutional investors .050 .143 .036 .283
Changes in board structure -.978 .332 -.928 .336
Changes in independence of board of 
directors and supervisory board -.039 .037 -.035 .052
Changes in 3 committees .154 .768 .089 .859
Introduction of employee director -3.603 .058 -3.410 .063
Shareholder composition 2.172 .046 2.558 .015
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Table 9：Descriptive statistics
Table 10: One-way ANOVA
*denotes statistically signifi cant at the 10％ level.
Table 11: Multiple comparison of ROE
* denotes statistically signifi cant at the 10％ level.
8.  Concluding Remarks
　Currently, global equity markets are characterized by a rapid increase in institutional investors, which have become 
an important element affecting the corporate management. Since early 2000s, institutional investors in Japan and 
France have become vocal and keen to exercise the voting rights to perform fi duciary responsibility. In accordance with 
the changing behavior of institutional investors, fi rms in both countries can no longer ignore the voice of institutional 
investors and the behavior of institutional investors has become an extremely important factor in considering firm 
management. Under the circumstances, this paper attempted to reveal the investment behavior and the effect of 
monitoring by institutional investors on fi rm performance. It was found that there is a statistically signifi cant diff erence 
between the change in institutional investors’ shareholdings and ROE, proxy for fi rm performance, in Japan, whereas 
a significant difference was not observed in France. However, by classifying the firms into three groups based on 
No. of fi rms Mean Standarddeviation
Standard
error
95% confi dence interval for
the mean value
Lower limit Upper limit
TobinQ
Group 1 37 1.5270 .99253 .16317 1.1961 1.8580
Group 2 37 1.3424 .38825 .06383 1.2130 1.4719
Group 3 37 1.3962 .90060 .14806 1.0959 1.6965
Total 111 1.4219 .80202 .07612 1.2710 1.5728
ROE
Group 1 37 2.2762 28.68489 4.71577 -7.2878 11.8402
Group 2 37 11.2405 7.95267 1.30741 8.5890 13.8921
Group 3 37 20.7370 52.73655 8.66984 3.1538 38.3203
Total 111 11.4179 35.46140 3.36585 4.7476 18.0882
ROA
Group 1 37 3.5230 7.54957 1.24114 1.0058 6.0401
Group 2 37 4.7995 3.16156 .51976 3.7453 5.8536
Group 3 37 5.4895 5.63713 .92674 3.6099 7.3690
Total 111 4.6040 5.74404 .54520 3.5235 5.6844
Sum of square Degree offreedom Mean square F-ratio P-value
TobinQ
Between groups .667 2 .333 .514 .600
Within group 70.090 108 .649
Total 70.757 110
ROE
Between groups 6306.575 2 3153.287 2.580 .080*
Within group 132019.617 108 1222.404
Total 138326.191 110
ROA
Between groups 73.662 2 36.831 1.119 .330
Within group 3555.675 108 32.923
Total 3629.336 110
Dependent variable: ROE Changes in the share ownership of institutional investors














the change in the ownership share of institutional investors during 2005-2010 in France, it was observed that the 
mean value of ROE in group 3 is higher than in other groups, indicating that the group with the highest increase of 
institutional investor’s ownership during the period shows better performance than other groups. The results imply 
that institutional investors select fi rms for investment based on the expected performance of ROE in both countries. As 
corporate activities become globalized, international portfolio investment by foreigners is likely to further increase in 
the foreseeable future. It is expected that the shareholding of institutional investors will rise in Japan and France due 
to an increase in investment trust. However, if short-term oriented institutional investors such as hedge funds dominate 
the institutional investors, it does not necessarily lead to the value creation of fi rms. If there is a positive correlation 
between institutional investors’ behavior and firm value, an enhancement of firm performance will contribute to 
reactivate the capital market in Japan and France, thus making a favorable impact on economic activities in general. In 
this regard, Japanese and French fi rms are called upon to make eff orts in enhancing the value creation.
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